

The manufacturer may use the mark:



Revision 1.1 August 12, 2022 Surveillance Audit Due October 1, 2025



# Certificate / Certificat Zertifikat / 合格証

ASC 2104058 C001

exida hereby confirms that the:

Redundant Control System (RCS)

ASCO, L.P.

Florham Park, NJ - USA

Have been assessed per the relevant requirements of:

IEC 61508: 2010 Parts 1-2

and meets requirements providing a level of integrity to:

Systematic Capability: SC 3 (SIL 3 Capable)

Random Capability: Type A, Route 2<sub>H</sub> Device

PFH/PFD<sub>avg</sub> and Architecture Constraints must be verified for each application

### Safety Function:

The Redundant Control System will move to the safe state of Normally Open, Normally Closed or Double Acting per the RCS configuration within the specified safety time when deenergized.

### **Application Restrictions:**

The unit must be properly designed into a Safety Instrumented Function per the Safety Manual requirements.



Evaluating Assessor

Certifying Assessor

# Redundant Control System

The following documents are a mandatory part of certification:

**Assessment Report:** ASC 21-04-058 R002 V1R1 (or later)

**Safety Manual:** SM V9535 R3 DA (or later)



80 N Main St Sellersville, PA 18960

T-061, V5R2

## Certificate / Certificat / Zertifikat / 合格証 ASC 2104058 C001

Systematic Capability: SC 3 (SIL 3 Capable)

Random Capability: Type A, Route 2<sub>H</sub> Device

PFH/PFD<sub>avg</sub> and Architecture Constraints must be verified for each application

#### Systematic Capability:

These product haves met manufacturer design process requirements of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 3. These are intended to achieve sufficient integrity against systematic errors of design by the manufacturer.

A Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) designed with this product must not be used at a SIL level higher than stated.

#### **Random Capability:**

The SIL limit imposed by the Architectural Constraints must be met for each element. This device meets exida criteria for Route  $2_H$ .

#### Versions:

| Architecture              | sov            | Application  |
|---------------------------|----------------|--|
| 1001HS RCS                | Aluminum or SS | NC Single Acting, De-Energize to Trip (DTT)<br>NO Single Acting, DTT |
| 2002D RCS                 | Aluminum or SS | Double Acting, DTT (2002 only)                                       |
| 2002 or 2003 Basic RCS    | Aluminum       | NC Single Acting, DTT  |
| 2002 or 2003D Premium RCS | Aluminum       | NC Single Acting, DTT  |

#### IEC 61508 Failure Rates in FIT1

| RCS Component (Manually Initiated Diagnostic Tests) |   | λsu | $\lambda_{DD}$ | λου |
|---|---|-----|----------------|-----|
| NC or NO, SA, DTT Solenoid Valve                    | 0 | 377 | 0              | 247 |
| DA, DTT Solenoid Valve                              | 0 | 332 | 0              | 289 |
| NC 2002 or 2003 Basic Manifold                      | 0 | 4   | 0              | 3   |
| NC 1oo1HS, 2oo2 or 2oo3 Manifold & Bypass Valve     | 0 | 53  | 0              | 26  |
| NO 10o1HS, NO or DA 20o2 Manifold & Bypass Valve    | 0 | 19  | 0              | 60  |
| GO Proximity Switch <sup>2</sup>                    | 0 | 0   | 0              | 0   |
| Pressure Switch <sup>2</sup>                        | 0 | 0   | 0              | 0   |

| RCS Component (Automated Diagnostic Tests)       |                     | λ <sub>su</sub> | λ <sub>DD</sub> | λου |
|--|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----|
| NC or NO, SA, DTT Solenoid Valve                 | 373                 | 4               | 230             | 17  |
| DA, DTT Solenoid Valve                           | 329                 | 3               | 267             | 22  |
| NC 2002 or 2003 Basic Manifold                   | N/A, no Diagnostics |                 |                 |     |
| NC 1oo1HS, 2oo2 or 2oo3 Manifold & Bypass Valve  | 52                  | 1               | 24              | 2   |
| NO 10o1HS, NO or DA 20o2 Manifold & Bypass Valve | 19                  | 0               | 54              | 6   |
| GO Proximity Switch <sup>2</sup>                 | 0                   | 0               | 0               | 0   |
| Pressure Switch <sup>2</sup>                     | 0                   | 0               | 0               | 0   |

#### SIL Verification:

The Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of an entire Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) must be verified via a calculation of PFH/PFD<sub>avg</sub> considering redundant architectures, proof test interval, proof test effectiveness, any automatic diagnostics, average repair time and the specific failure rates of all products included in the SIF. Each element must be checked to assure compliance with minimum hardware fault tolerance (HFT) requirements.

Page 2 of 2