



FUNCTIONAL SAFETY CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the

K-Series Switchbox

Manufactured by

Topworx
3300 Fern Valley Road
Louisville
Kentucky 40213
USA

Emerson AFCP UK Ltd.
Pit Hey Place
Skelmersdale
WN8 9PG
United Kingdom

Has been assessed by Sira Certification Service with reference to the CASS methodologies and found to meet the requirements of

IEC 61508-2:2010 Systematic Capability (SC3)

As an element suitable for use in safety related systems performing safety functions up to and including

Use as an Indicator – up to and including SIL 2*

When used in accordance with the scope and conditions of this certificate

* This certificate does not waive the need for further functional safety verification to establish the achieved Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of the safety related system

Certification Manager:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Lyons', written over a light blue horizontal line.

Certification Manager

Initial Certification: 04th January 2019
This certificate re-issued: 22nd October 2024
Renewal date: 15th June 2029

This certificate may only be reproduced in its entirety without any change.

Certificate No.: Sira FSP 19001/03
Form 7016 issue 3
Page 1 of 6



0011

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Report Summary

<p><u>Safety Function:</u> <i>To provide an indication of the monitored valve position via 2 outputs via:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1- 4-20mA output using 5337D module 2- GO – switches, reed or standard switches. <p>Output current signal will be as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Valve fully open = 20mA • Valve fully closed = 4mA • Faults 0 mA. 					
Summary of IEC 61508-2 Clauses 7.4.2 and 7.4.4		K-Series Valvetop Indicators			
Architectural constraints & Type of product A/B		HFT = 0 Main parts: Type A	HFT = 1 Magnet & SW1&2, Type A	HFT = 0, 5337D 4-20mA module Type B	Overall output, magnet+ 5337D Overall Indicator K-Series
Safe Failure Fraction (SFF)		SFF : (73%) SIL 2 (1001)	SFF: 20% SIL 2 (1002)	SFF: 75.6% SIL 1 (1001)	SIL 2
Random hardware failures: [h ⁻¹]	λ_{DD} λ_{DU}	0.0 4.5E-09	0.0 6.55E-09	0.0 1.04E-07	0.0 1.74E-07
Random hardware failures: [h ⁻¹]	λ_{SD} λ_{SU}	0.0 1.23E-08	0.0 8.06E-08	0.0 3.23E-07	0.0 3.51E-07
Diagnostic coverage (DC) Common Cause Failures		0.0%	0.0% β : 10%	0.0%	0.0%
PFD @ PTI = 8760 Hrs. MTTR = 8 Hrs.					7.62E-04
Probability of Dangerous failure, High Demand, PFH h ⁻¹		4.5E-09	6.55E-09	1.04E-07	1.74E-07
Hardware safety integrity		Route 1 _H			
Systematic safety integrity		Route 1 _s			
Systematic Capability (SC1, SC2, SC3, SC4)		SC 3			
Hardware safety integrity achieved		SIL 2 (Low Demand) SIL 2 (High Demand)			



Product description and scope of K – Series certification



Figure 1: Typical Assembly of the K-Series Valvetop Indicators

K-Series Valve Indicators fitted with 4-20 mA output

K-Series discrete valve indicators are certified for use in every world area. They carry IECEx, ATEX, and UL certifications in a single model, making it easier for global customers to standardize across plants in multiple world areas.

The K-Series consists of six models, such as K**- LH*, RH*, MH*, LX*, RX*, MX*, variants are all capable of incorporating a pilot valve and position sensors with the enclosure differing per model type depending on the application requirements.

Modules in the K-Series Valve Controller

The K-Series Valve Controller consists of the following modules:

- 2 sets of Magnet
- 2 sets of Go-Switches or equivalent.
- Shaft (only plays part in indicator safety function)
- Sensor Module
- Indicator Beacon (only plays part in indicator safety function)

K-Series Safety Functions

The safety functions of the D-Series Valve Controller are defined as:

K-Series as an Indicator:

- To provide an accurate indication of the monitored valve position.

Product identification and configuration

The product is defined in the manufacturer's drawings listed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Certified product drawings

Document no.	Rev	Date	Document description
K1P-0HCGNPS-180912123246	-	12/09/2018	Schematic for the K1P-0HCGNPS
K1P-0XCGNPS-180912123402	-	12/09/2018	Schematic for the K1P-0XCGNPS
K2P-LHCGNPS-180912123503	-	12/09/2018	Schematic for the K2P-LHCGNPS

Certificate No.: Sira FSP 19001/03
Form 7016 issue 3
Page 3 of 6



0011

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K2P-LXCGNPS-180912123550	-	12/09/2018	Schematic for the K2P-LXCGNPS
K1P-0X0FBMS	-	-	Bill of Materials for K1
K2P-LHCBNMS	-	-	Bill of Materials for K2

The assessment has produced the supporting information given in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Base Information

1	Product identification:	D-Series as described in manufacturer's product catalogue
2	Functional specification:	Refer to paragraph above 'Use in safety functions' and full specification in manufacturer's product catalogue.
3-5	Random hardware failure rates:	Refer to table in report summary
6	Environment limits:	Temperature range: Solenoid option:-20 to +100°C for the D-Series GO switch option:-60 to +100°C for the D-Series
7	Lifetime/replacement limits:	Refer to IOM manual K-Series – to be followed.
8	Proof Test requirements:	
9	Maintenance requirements:	
10	Diagnostic coverage:	NA
11	Diagnostic test interval:	
12	Repair constraints:	Refer to IOM manual D-Series – to be followed
13	Safe Failure Fraction:	Refer to table in report summary
14	Hardware fault tolerance (HFT):	
15	Highest SIL (architecture/type A/B):	
16	Systematic failure constraints:	The requirements of this clause are contained in the relevant IOM Manual K-Series – To be followed
17	Evidence of similar conditions in previous use:	Compliance Route 2 _H (proven-in-use) not used
18	Evidence supporting the application under different conditions of use:	
19	Evidence of period of operational use:	
20	Statement of restrictions on functionality:	
21	Systematic capability:	
22	Systematic fault avoidance measures:	This assessment is based on an element which is to be used in a SRS and is not a full SRS design related assessment.
23	Systematic fault tolerance measures:	
24	Validation records:	



Conditions of Certification

The validity of the certified data is conditional on the Manufacturer complying with the following conditions:

1. The manufacturer shall analyse failure data from returned products on an on-going basis. Sira Certification Service shall be informed in the event of any indication that the actual failure rates are worse than the certified failure rates. (A process to rate the validity of field data should be used. To this end, the manufacturer should co-operate with users to operate a formal field-experience feedback programme).
2. Sira shall be notified in advance (with an impact analysis report) before any modifications to the certified equipment or the functional safety information in the user documentation is carried out. Sira may need to perform a re-assessment if modifications are judged to affect the product's functional safety certified herein.
3. On-going lifecycle activities associated with this product (e.g., modifications, corrective actions, field failure analysis) shall be subject to surveillance by Sira in accordance with 'Regulations Applicable to the Holders of Sira Certificates'.

Conditions of Safe Use

The validity of the certified data is conditional on the user complying with the following conditions:

1. The user shall comply with the requirements given in the manufacturer's user documentation (referred to in Table 2 above) in regard to all relevant functional safety aspects such as application of use, installation, operation, maintenance, proof tests, maximum ratings, environmental conditions, repair, etc;
2. Selection of this equipment for use in safety functions and the installation, configuration, overall validation, maintenance and repair shall only be carried out by competent personnel, observing all the manufacturer's conditions and recommendations in the user documentation.
3. All information associated with any field failures of this product should be collected under a dependability management process (e.g., IEC 60300-3-2) and reported to the manufacturer.
4. The unit should be tested at regular intervals to identify any malfunctions; in accordance with the safety manual.

General Conditions and Notes

1. This certificate is based upon a functional safety assessment of the product described in Sira Test & Certification Assessment Report R70198140A.
2. If certified product or system is found not to comply, Sira Certification Service should be notified immediately at the address shown on this certificate.
3. The use of this Certificate and the Sira Certification Mark that can be applied to the product or used in publicity material are subject to the 'Regulations Applicable to the Holders of Sira Certificates' and 'Supplementary Regulations Specific to Functional Safety Certification'.
4. This document remains the property of Sira and shall be returned when requested by the issuer.



Certificate History

Issue	Date	Document no.	Comment
00	04 Jan 2019	R70198140A	Prime certificate.
01	07 Nov 2023	80129810 - 04	Added Emerson AFCP UK Ltd manufacturing location
02	16 Feb 2024	80189295	Re-issued following successful recertification audit.
03	22 Oct 2024	80189295	Updated certificate, removal of Annex A.

